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Following an 8-year long dispute over cotton subsidies, 
Brazil and the United States signed a Memorandum of 
Understanding on April 21, 2010, effectively paving 
the way for settling the dispute. This paper argues that 
cotton subsidies are just the tip of the iceberg while a 
number of other, perhaps more important, issues require 
attention and, indeed, political will. Chief among them 
is the persistent divergence between cotton prices and the 
prices of other agricultural commodities, which reflects, 
for the most part, the large supply response by China 
and India, a direct consequence of con-version to biotech 
cotton varieties in these (and other) countries. Such 
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response—which kept cotton prices low, compared with 
other commodities—imposes a competitive disadvantage 
to non-users of biotech cotton. The paper also highlights 
two additional constraints faced by the cotton producing 
countries of West and Central Africa, namely, the 
structural inefficiencies of their primary processing 
industries (also known as ginning) and the appreciation 
of the CFA franc against the US dollar. Without 
downplaying the importance of subsidy elimination, the 
paper concludes that these impediments should receive 
high priority in the policy agenda. 
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Cotton Subsidies, the WTO, and the ‘Cotton Problem’ 
1. INTRODUCTION 
For nearly a decade, Brazil and the United States have been embroiled in a dis-
pute over cotton subsidies. On April 6, 2010, the US Trade Representative and 
the US Secretary of Agriculture announced that the countries agreed upon a path 
toward negotiated settlement (USTR 2010a). Two weeks later a Memorandum of 
Understanding was signed (USTR 2010b) while on June 17, 2010 the framework 
agreement  was  made  public  (USTR  2010c).  The  agreement  highlights  both 
strengths and limitations of the current dispute settlement system. On the one 
hand, a negotiated settlement was reached through WTO rules and a ‚trade war‛ 
was avoided. Moreover, the agreement shows that less powerful members of the 
global trading system (in this case, Brazil) can successfully argue their case in the 
WTO. But two key limitations were also exposed: Unless the ‚injured‛ party has 
enough  trade  leverage  with  the  ‚guilty‛  party,  authorization  of  countermea-
sures—the  typical  WTO  stimulus  to  encourage  compliance—is  of  limited  use 
(and is costly to the imposing country and does not assist cotton producers, see 
Anderson 2002). Many countries may not be able to economically justify taking 
their case to the WTO, either because of weak capacity or because the relevant 
sector is too small to justify raising the issue. 
In addition to modifying certain elements of the Export Credit Guarantee 
Program, the agreement proposed the establishment of a fund for technical assis-
tance and capacity building of Brazil’s cotton sector. Some of the fund’s resources 
will be used for activities related to international assistance to the cotton sector in 
certain other countries. Although not explicitly stated, the use of resources for 
third  countries  was  in  response  to  another  on-going  cotton  dispute  that  was 
brought to the WTO in 2003 by four African cotton producing countries over the 
same subsidies. Therefore, the framework agreement, in addition to addressing 
the US-Brazil cotton dispute deals (at least in principle) with a number of com-
plex development issues. 
While these are noteworthy achievements, this paper argues that the cot-
ton dispute, despite consuming a lot of political capital, constitutes just the tip of 
the iceberg. There are a number of other issues at play that require attention by 
policy makers. Chief among them is the divergence between cotton prices and 
the prices of other agricultural commodities, which for the most part reflects the 
large supply response that took place in the cotton industry, as a consequence of 
the conversion to biotech varieties by China and India (which now account for 55 
percent of global cotton supplies). The paper also highlights two key constraints 3 
 
faced  by  the  cotton  producing  countries  of  West  and  Central  Africa  (WCA), 
namely,  the  structural  inefficiencies  of  the  primary  processing  industry  (also 
known as ginning), and the appreciation of the CFAf (the common currency of 
WCA countries) against the $US. Without downplaying the importance of trade 
interventions, this paper concludes that addressing the technology, inefficiency, 
and  macro  impediments  should  receive  high  priority  on  the  policy  making 
agenda. 
The  rest  of  the  paper  proceeds  as  follows.  The  next  section  briefly  ex-
amines the origins and the history of the cotton dispute. Section 3 discusses the 
broader implications of the agreement between Brazil and the United States. The 
penultimate section goes beyond trade and subsidies and argues that addressing 
the development aspects of the cotton dispute is complicated by a number of fac-
tors, the  most  important  of  which  are  the structural  changes  that  have taken 
place in the global cotton market and the domestic inefficiencies faced by WCA 
cotton  producers,  including  the  countries  that  brought  the  cotton  case  to  the 
WTO. The last section concludes. 
2. THE COTTON DISPUTE 
The origins of the cotton dispute go back to 2002 when Brazil and four African 
cotton producers (Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad, and Mali, the so-called C-4) argued 
that cotton subsidies caused world cotton prices to decline and reduced their ex-
port revenues.1 At the time, the value of global cotton output averaged between 
$25 and $30 billion and the United States (which accounts for one-third of world 
cotton exports) supported its cotton industry to the tune of $2 to $4 billion a n-
nually (see figure 1). The EU provided considerable support to its cottons sector 
as well—around $1 billion annually—though applied to much less cotton and 
hence much lower impact on world prices.2 
                                                           
1 The issue of cotton subsidies received traction during a conference, co-sponsored by the Interna-
tional Cotton Advisory Committee and the World Bank during July 8-9, 2002, ‚Cotton and Global 
Trade Negotiations‛ in Washington, DC. The conference attracted a diverse group of participants 
including representatives from cotton producing countries (both government officials and private 
sector), civil society organizations, embassies, and international organizations. The ‘cotton prob-
lem’  received  more  publicity  after  Oxfam  (2002)  published  the  report  ‚Cultivating  Poverty‛ 
which highlighted both trade and development implications of cotton subsidies. A behind-the-
scenes account of the cotton dispute can be found in a Harvard Business School case study (see 
Milligan, Goldberg, and Lawrence 2009). 
2 Numerous other countries subsidize their cotton sectors as well. However, they have received 
less attention either because their subsidies are small and indirect (e.g., India, Turkey, and some 
WCA countries) or because the accuracy of the statistics has been questioned (e.g., China). See 
ICAC (2010) for the latest update on cotton subsidies. 4 
 
The cotton subsidies raised not only issues of trade fairness but also con-
cerns regarding their negative impact on development. Although at a global lev-
el, cotton represents only 0.1 percent of world merchandize trade, in some devel-
oping countries it accounts for as much as one third of their export earnings (fig-
ure 2). Furthermore, while cotton is not important to the United States (it only 
contributes 0.4 percent to its merchandize exports), the United States is impor-
tant to the cotton market since it accounts for one third of global exports. It is be-
cause of these imbalances that cotton subsidies received so much attention. 
Even  though  the  subsidies  affect  all  non-subsidizing,  cotton-producing 
countries, only Brazil and the C-4 chose to bring the case to the WTO and, de-
spite the fact that both fought the same subsidies, they chose different paths. 
Brazil went the traditional dispute settlement route. On September 27, 2002 it re-
quested consultations with the United States and soon the WTO’s Dispute Set-
tlement Body (DSB) established a panel to examine the issue (see WTO 2002). In 
its final ruling, issued on September 8, 2004, the WTO concluded that the United 
States had to remove the adverse effects of the subsidies or withdraw them. The 
United States appealed but the Appellate Body upheld the panel’s original rul-
ing.  Subsequent compliance  actions taken by the United States (including  the 
removal of the step-2 payment, an export subsidy) did not satisfy Brazil and a 
compliance panel was established. WTO arbitrators issued awards totaling $830 
million (much lower than the $3 billion requested by Brazil) and (effective April 
7,  2010)  allowed  Brazil  to  impose  countermeasures,  including  sectors  outside 
merchandize trade such as intellectual property and services (see Schnepf 2010 
for a timeline and analysis of the key events leading to the agreement). 
The C-4 brought the case of cotton subsidies to the WTO as well but, in-
stead of joining Brazil and proceeding within the usual WTO channels, entered 
unchartered territory by demanding financial compensation. On June 10, 2003, 
aided by the Geneva-based NGO IDEAS, the C-4 launched the ‚Sectoral Initia-
tive in Favour of Cotton‛ (often referred to as the cotton initiative), demanding 
that countries discontinue cotton subsidies and directly compensate nonsubsidiz-
ing countries.3 The rationale behind C-4’s demand for financial compensation re-
flected (most likely) the fact that even a favorable WTO ruling allowing them to 
impose countermeasures would not have been of much help because of their li-
mited trade with the United States and hence incapacity to pose a credible threat 
of retaliation. Moreover, because the C-4 (and numerous other developing coun-
tries) often impose high tariffs for tax revenue purposes, increasing them much 
                                                           
3 The initiative was presented at the Cancún Trade Ministerial Conference as the agenda item 
‚Poverty Reduction: Sectoral Initiative in Favour of Cotton—Joint Proposal by Benin, Burkina 
Faso, Chad and Mali‛ (WTO 2003). 5 
 
further could effectively eliminate imports.4 
The cotton initiative marked the first time that the WTO had to deal with a 
financial compensation issue rather than the typical remedy of authorizing coun-
termeasures.5  After the Cancún Ministerial in September 2003 it was decided 
that, because of numerous practical difficulties, the cotton initiative could be 
dealt within two tracks: development (compensation) and trade (subs idies). At 
the WTO-sponsored workshop in March of 2004, it was further decided that the 
International Financial Institutions and other international and bilateral organ i-
zations would help with the development component. The Doha Development 
Agenda (DDA) wo uld address the trade component (see appendix A). Little 
progress has taken place on either front in the sense that financial compensation 
as envisaged by the cotton initiative has not taken place, while progress on DDA 
has been slow. In fact, it is believed that the inability to deal successfully with the 
cotton  initiative  may  have  been  one  of  the  main  factors  behind  DDA’s  slow 
progress. 
3. THE DEVELOPMENT IMPLICATIONS OF THE AGREEMENT 
What triggered the agreement between Brazil and the United States? Most likely, 
the  turning  point  was  the  authorization  to  impose  cross-sectoral  countermea-
sures outside of trade in goods, specifically intellectual property and services. 
From a strategic point of view, that  was expected. As early as 2005, Zachary 
warned: 
The Brazilians are eyeing things like computers, software, and heavy machi-
nery. If and when those duties are imposed, it won’t be just critics of govern-
                                                           
4 The treatment of poor countries within the WTO has been discussed extensively. See Mattoo 
and Subramanian (2004) for a discussion regarding low income countries’ limited ability to en-
gage in reciprocity. 
5 The issue of financial compensation as a WTO remedy is very complex both economically and 
legally. Furthermore, opinions on its effectiveness and likely impact on compliance differ. Davies 
(2006, p. 67), for example, argued that financial compensation ‚is likely to have a higher com-
pliance inducement effect since the payment of a monetary amount to the claimant state is likely 
to be felt more keenly than trade compensation.‛ But he also acknowledged that securing budge-
tary authorization for financial compensation may prove difficult for many countries. Yet, Mer-
curio (2009, p. 336) is critical of financial compensation: ‚… in fact, it could be argued that finan-
cial compensation could even result in decreasing Member’s overall rate of compliance (given 
that all forms of compensation are essentially voluntary). In addition … both trade and financial 
compensation raise a host of other unknowns and uncertainties which not only could potentially 
run counter to existing obligations or are contrary to deeply embedded principles of the WTO but 
also could possibly destabilize the entire dispute settlement system.‛ In some respects, the cotton 
dispute highlights some of the difficulties pointed out by Mercurio (2009). 6 
 
ment waste that will be alarmed over the cotton program. It’ll be Caterpillar, In-
tel, Microsoft, and scores of other companies that, generally speaking, don’t get 
a dime of direct subsidies and are far bigger players in the U.S. economy. 
 In other words, the United States came to this agreement in order to prevent 
domestic  political  collateral  damage.  Under  the  agreement—discussed  in  the 
next section—Brazil will not make use of the authorized countermeasures. 
a.  The framework agreement 
The framework agreement consists of two key elements. 
First, it would provide, as a basis for a discussion toward reaching a mutually 
agreed  solution  to  the  dispute,  a  limit  on  trade-distorting  cotton  subsidies. 
Second, the Framework would provide benchmarks for changes to certain ele-
ments of the current GSM-102 program. In the Framework, the United States and 
Brazil would agree to meet quarterly to discuss the successor legislation to the 
2008 Farm Bill as it relates to trade-distorting cotton subsidies and the operation 
of GSM-102. The Framework would not serve as a permanent solution to the Cot-
ton dispute. However, it would provide specific interim steps and a process for 
continued discussions on the programs at issue with a view to reaching a solu-
tion to the dispute. 
In effect, the United States agreed to make some near term modifications 
to the operation of Export Credit Guarantee Program. Under the program, pri-
vate US banks extend credit guarantees to approved foreign banks for purchase 
of US agricultural products. Technically speaking, this part of the agreement is 
the most relevant to the trade dispute. But, the concession is very small given 
that the most ‚damaging‛ components of the US cotton program take the form of 
marketing  loans  and  countercyclical  payments.  These  are  expected  to  be  ad-
dressed in the 2012 US Farm Bill.6 
Two other elements of the agreement tell a more interesting story. 
… the United States agreed to work with Brazil to establish a fund of approx-
imately $147.3 million per year on a pro rata basis to provide technical assistance 
and capacity building to the cotton sector in Brazil, and for international coop-
eration related to the same sector in certain other countries [emphasis added]. 
Under  the  Memorandum  of  Understanding  that  the  United  States  and  Brazil 
signed on April 20, 2010, the fund would continue until passage of the next Farm 
Bill or a mutually agreed solution to the Cotton dispute is reached, whichever is 
sooner. The fund is subject to transparency and auditing requirements. 
Thus, the United States will compensate Brazil’s cotton sector, until the 
subsidies are dealt with, which is what the C-4 had asked for and never received. 
More interestingly, the agreement mentions international cooperation related to 
the same sector in certain other countries, in effect recognizing that there are oth-
                                                           
6 Or, as IDEAS (2010, p. 2) put it: ‚What Brazil obtains thanks to this framework deal is leverage 
on the Farm Bill, a means to influence the future US cotton support regime.‛ 7 
 
er developing countries which have been ‚injured‛ by the subsidies but never 
brought their cases to the WTO (or, as with the C-4, they brought the case to the 
WTO but did not join Brazil).7 
b.  The broader implications of the agreement 
From the perspective of the world trading system, the agreement is a step in the 
right  direction.  Apart  from  avoiding  a  ‚trade  war‛,  the  agreement  makes 
progress towards addressing two key shortcomings of the current trading sys-
tem: the inability of less powerful trading partners to bring their cases to the 
WTO and the need to broaden ‚sentencing‛ to include financial compensation 
when countermeasures are not applicable. Furthermore, the agreement rightly 
addresses some of the development issues that have been debated not only with-
in the context of the cotton initiative but also within the DDA process. Neverthe-
less, implementation of the agreement is likely to encounter numerous difficul-
ties. 
Giving technical assistance to Brazil’s cotton producers implies a more ef-
ficient Brazilian cotton sector thus, more cotton being supplied in the world mar-
ket  and  lower  world  cotton  prices.  Admittedly,  the  amount  specified  in  the 
agreement is unlikely to have any significant impact on the global cotton market 
hence this point may be viewed as a theoretical concern.8 But it does highlight the 
fact that resolving the dispute through financial compensation may create  colla-
teral damage, unless such compensation takes place in a non -distortionary man-
ner. 
At a more pragmatic level, if addressing ‚international cooperation related to 
the same sector in certain other countries” means that part of the fund will be used 
for other countries, then there are several difficulties with delivery mechanisms 
and coordination arrangements. For example: Does Brazil need any more assis-
tance  than,  say,  Ethiopia  or  Malawi?  Should  cotton  exporting  countries  other 
than the C-4 receive assistance, perhaps, Australia, India, Uzbekistan? Should 
countries that are  cotton producers but not exporters receive assistance, since 
their producers received lower prices too? Who receives assistance: the country’s 
finance department through a budget support mechanism or should support go 
                                                           
7 The language used in the Memorandum was more specific in that it referred to the cotton sector 
explicitly and it mentioned countries and regions: “the fund may also be used for activities related to 
international cooperation in the cotton sector in sub-Saharan Africa, in Mercosur member and associate 
members, in Haiti, or in any other developing country as the parties may agree upon  …‛ See Baffes 
(2010a) for a summary discussion of the Memorandum of Understanding. 
8 However, if compensation was based on Brazil’s request of $US 3 billion, then the effect would 
be significant. 8 
 
directly to the producers? If the latter, how is the assistance going to be distri-
buted among several hundred thousand smallholders? 
Interestingly, it was difficulties in answering these (and numerous other) 
questions that led to the separation of the cotton dispute into trade (subsidies) to 
be  dealt  within  the  DDA  framework  and  development  (compensation)  to  be 
dealt by existing aid delivery mechanisms from multilateral and bilateral devel-
opment agencies. However, the development aspects of the cotton dispute not 
only are complex, but are much more important than subsidies, as the next sec-
tion argues. 
4. BEYOND SUBSIDIES AND TRADE 
While the elimination of cotton subsidies is indeed important from trade fairness 
and development perspectives, this is just the tip of the iceberg as far as African 
cotton growers are concerned. There are broader and deeper issues in the global 
cotton market with much stronger impact on cotton prices and growers’ incomes. 
In fact, there is a ‘cotton problem’ not just a ‘cotton dispute’ as figure 3 illustrates. 
This section places the issue of cotton subsidies into perspective by analyzing 
them side-by-side with other issues affecting the global cotton market, namely, 
biotech cotton varieties, structural inefficiencies of the WCA ginning industry, 
and the appreciation of the CFAf against the $US. 
a.  The divergence between cotton and other agricultural prices 
Cotton prices have been low during the past decade. Interestingly, such weak-
ness  took  place  against  the  backdrop  of  the  broadest  and  largest  commodity 
price boom during post-WWII (World Bank 2009). Between 2003 and 2008, no-
minal prices of energy and metals increased by 230 percent, those of food and 
precious metals doubled, and those of fertilizers increased fourfold. The boom 
reached its zenith in July 2008, when crude oil prices averaged $US 133/barrel, up 
94 percent from a year earlier. Rice prices doubled within just five months of 
2008, from $US 375/ton in January to $757/ton in June. And, while most prices 
have weakened considerably since their 2008 peak, they are still twice as high 
compared to their early 2000s real levels. 
Yet, cotton prices did not join the boom. Between 2000 and 2009 the World 
Bank index of nominal food prices doubled but cotton prices remained almost 
unchanged (see figure 4). Econometric evidence strongly confirms the divergence 
between cotton and other agricultural commodity prices. Consider the following 
ordinary least squares regression: 9 
 
log(PtC) = μ + β1log(PtAG) + β2log(MUVt) + β3t + εt.          [1] 
PtC and PtAG denote the price of cotton and the agricultural commodity price in-
dex in year t (expressed in nominal dollar terms), MUVt denotes the deflator, t is 
the time trend, and εt denotes the error term; μ, β1, β2, and β3 are parameters to be 
estimated. The first two rows of table 2 report results for the 1960-2009 and 1960-
10 periods, respectively (the exclusion/inclusion of 2010 was motivated by the 
desire the capture the effect of remarkable recovery in cotton prices that took 
place in 2010). The estimate of β1 is 0.61 (without 2010) and 0.66 (with 2010) and 
highly significant in both cases with adjusted-R2s equal to 0.91 and ADF statistics 
of -6.03 and -6.21, implying a very strong co-movement between cotton prices 
and the agricultural commodity price index. 
To examine the divergence between agriculture and cotton prices, [1] was 
reformulated by introducing two dummy variables, D1 (equal to 1 during 1960-
2001 and zero elsewhere) and D2, applied to both µ and β1. Hence, [1] becomes: 
log(PtC) = D1 + D2 + β11D1*log(PtAG) + β12D2*log(PtAG) + β2log(MUVt) + β3t + εt.  [2] 
Results from [2] are reported in columns 3-6 of table 2. To examine the sensitivity 
of the model, columns 3 and 4 show results corresponding to D1 taking the value 
of one during 1960-2001. In view of the large cotton price increase in 2010, the 
model was run with and without the last observation, 2010. Columns 5 and 6 
correspond to D1 taking the value of one during 1960-2002, again with and with-
out 2010. The choice of 2001 or 2002 as the break year is expected to capture the 
introduction of biotech cotton in China and India. 
Regardless  of  the  specification  considered,  the  econometric  evidence 
overwhelmingly shows that while there was a strong relationship between the 
price of cotton and the other agricultural commodity prices up to 2002 that rela-
tionship weakened considerably during 2003-10. While it is unclear whether the 
gap will persist much longer, the fact that it has persisted for almost a decade 
implies considerable welfare losses for non-users of biotech cotton varieties. The 
next section discusses the reasons behind the divergence. 
b.  Causes of the divergence 
There are three reasons why cotton prices did not join the commodity price boom 
(they are discussed in order of importance.) The first, and perhaps most impor-
tant, reason is the rapid and massive expansion of cotton production that took 
place in China and India, as a direct consequence of these countries’ adoption of 
biotech cotton. During the five-year period 2002-07, China increased its cotton 
output by 55 percent (from 5.2 to 8.1 million tons) while India increased its out-10 
 
put by 125 percent (from 2.3 to 5.2 million tons).9 Today, these two countries do-
minate the global cotton industry, accounting for more than half of global cotton 
production, mostly from biotech varieties. During 2009/10, biote ch cotton varie-
ties as a share of cotton area accounted for 68 percent in China and 79 percent in 
India (see figure 5).10 
Notice that the pros and cons of adopting biotech cotton varieties have 
been extensively discussed (see Tripp 2009 for a comprehensive  review of the li-
terature). For example, FAO’s (2004) review showed that on balance, biotech cot-
ton growers are better off than growers of conventional varieties. Baffes (2005) 
argued that in addition to subsidy elimination and domestic reforms, adoption of 
biotech varieties should have been a priority among policymakers in low-income 
cotton  producing  countries.  Similarly,  Falck-Zepeda,  Horna  and  Smale  (2007) 
and Anderson and Valenzuela (2008) conclude that the downward pressure on 
world cotton prices caused by the large-scale adoption of biotech cotton is likely 
to force other countries to adopt the technology in order to compete in the global 
market. Anderson and Valenzuela (2007) found that the benefits from full adop-
tion of biotech cotton varieties by African cotton-producing countries could be 
even greater than the benefits of the removal of all cotton subsidies by the United 
States and the European Union. Subramanian and Qaim (2010) found that the 
expansion of biotech cotton in India contributed to poverty reduction and rural 
development.11 Yet, with the single exception of Burkina Faso which engaged in 
biotech trials earlier in the decade and is well into fully converting to biotech v a-
rieties, no other SSA country has taken concrete steps in addressing th is issue 
(see figure 6). 
Second, as discussed earlier, cotton subsidies encourage more production 
than would have taken place without the support. They therefore depress world 
                                                           
9 The rapid expansion of biotech cotton has been facilitated by the absence of negative consumer 
reaction because cotton is not viewed as a food crop—though cotton oil, a key by-product of seed 
cotton, is a food item; it represents about 10 percent of the value of cotton (although only 3 per-
cent of global production of the 17 most important fats and oils). 
10 Most of increase in cotton production in China and India came from yield increases. The reason 
biotech cotton induces large yield increases in developing countries reflects the fact that in these 
countries, growers spray much less compared to developed countries. Because biotech technolo-
gy requires less numbers of sprayings, its adoption implies an outward shift of the production 
possibilities frontier (when applied in developing countries) rather than a move along the pro-
duction possibility frontier (when applied in developed countries). 
11 For a discussion of the political economy of agricultural biotech policies in developing countries 
see Paarlberg (2008), Graff, Hochman, and Zilberman (2009), and Herring (2009). 11 
 
prices.12 The effect of subsidies on the world price of cotton has been hotly d e-
bated and the estimates vary widely. After reviewing the literature, Baffes (2005, 
p. 122) concluded that ‚… setting all differences aside, however, and taking a simple 
average over all models shows that world cotton prices would have been 10 percent higher 
without support.‛ Sumner (2006, p. 19) reached a remarkably similar conclusion: 
‚Weighing all the evidence from a variety of sources, a 10 percent increase in the world 
price of cotton is a reasonable estimate if the cotton subsidy programs were removed un-
der the cotton initiative while other farm production subsidies were also reduced substan-
tially.‛ Jales (2010) found that reforms consistent with the December 2008 DDA 
draft modalities would imply world cotton prices 6 percent higher over 1998-
2007 (ranging between a high of 10 percent in 2001 and a low of 2 percent in 
2007). Reforms by the United States consistent with full implementation of DSB’s 
recommendations would have increased cotton prices by 3.5 percent (ranging 
between a high of 6.5 percent 2001 and a low of 1 percent in 2007). 
Third, the 2006-08 boom in food prices was partly aided by growth in de-
mand  for  biofuel  production  (albeit,  much  less  than  originally  thought).  Al-
though the direct impact of biofuel demand is felt only by maize, sugarcane, and 
some edible oils, the indirect impact is felt by most agricultural crops, because of 
the strong substitutability both on the input side (i.e., by shifting land and other 
inputs from one crop to another) and on the output side (especially in animal 
feed  and  vegetable  oils  which  are  highly  substitutable  commodities).  Because 
cotton is not a close substitute to any other commodity, there no substitutability 
on the output side. There is substitutability only on the input side as land can be 
used for other crops. But even there, substitutability is quite limited, at least in 
the short term, because other inputs, primary processing facilities, picking ma-
chinery, and other equipment are cotton-specific. Thus, converting cotton land to 
other crops and vice-versa takes more time compared to converting land from, 
say, wheat to maize. Indeed, between 2000-04 and 2005-09 (two periods that can 
be viewed as without and with biofuel as well), global area allocated to cotton 
declined by less than one percent.13 
To summarize, subsidies and biofuel expansion have played relatively 
modest roles in widening the gap between cotton and agricultural prices. The 
chief reason behind the weakness in cotton prices has been the massive supply 
                                                           
12 Distortions due to subsidies are not specific to cotton. Most commodity sectors are affected by 
import tariffs and many also by domestic supports, export subsidies or export taxes (see Aksoy 
and Beghin 2005, Anderson 2009). 
13  Although cotton area in the United States declined by almost 20 percent during these two pe-
riods, global cotton area (excluding the United States) increased by 3 percent. Global maize area 
increased more than 10 percent during this period. The same change applied to the United States. 12 
 
response by China and India. And, the key driver behind such supply response 
has been the adoption of biotechnology by those two countries, which contri-
buted to both area expansion and yield increases (detailed biotech cotton adop-
tion by country and year is reported in table B1 of Appendix B). Yet, as men-
tioned earlier (and elaborated in greater detail below), the cotton sectors of the C-
4 face two additional impediments, namely the inefficiencies of their cotton in-
dustries and the region’s exchange rate regime. 
c.  Further impediments faced by the C-4 
The cotton industries of all WCA countries were pioneered by a French state-
owned company in conjunction with national state-owned cotton companies.14 
These companies had a legal monopsony in cotton buying, and most had a m o-
nopoly on primary processing, marketing, and supplying inputs. Typically, they 
would announce a base buying price before planting, sometimes supplementing 
that price with a second payment (payable in the following season) based on the 
company’s financial health. Several policy reform attempts were made during 
the 1980s and 1990s, but the basic structure of the industries remained virtually 
unchanged (Baffes 2009). 
Policy  reforms  were  undertaken  during  the  past  few  years  (Tschirley, 
Poulton, and Labaste 2009). Burkina Faso led the effort by allowing competition, 
when two private companies entered the market in specific zones which produce 
about 15 percent of the country’s cotton output. After several postponements, the 
cotton company of Benin was split into three private companies in 2008. Mali’s 
cotton company, which has been operating in the traditional manner until 2010, 
is undertaking reforms with the ultimate objective to transition into a regional 
monopoly structure with four private companies. Finally, Chad’s cotton sector 
has been virtually unreformed. Yet, despite the reforms in most WCA countries, 
the sectors have retained a number of their former characteristics: the ginning 
companies have high costs, panterritorial and panseasonal pricing schemes pre-
vail, and (on some occasions) political interference in the sector continues due to 
its importance in the economies of these countries. As a result, operating costs for 
the ginning companies remain excessively high by international standards while 
the  process  of  world  prices  signal  transmission  to  domestic  markets  is  very 
                                                           
14 The company was CFDT (Compagnie Française de Développement des Fibres Textiles). It was re-
named to DAGRIS (Développement des Agro-Industries du Sud) in 2001. In January 2008 DAGRIS 
was renamed to Geocoton after it was purchased by the Advens Group (51 percent) and CMA-CGM 
(49 percent). 13 
 
slow.15 
A second impediment has been the CFAf’s appreciation against the $US. 
The CFAf was pegged to the French franc (FF) until 1999 and to the euro since 
then (1 € = 656 CFAf). Since its creation in 1945 it has been adjusted only twice: in 
October 1948 (from 1 FF = 1.70 CFAf to 2.00 CFAf) and in January 1994 (from 1 FF 
= 100 CFAf to 200 CFAf). The CFAf has been praised for offering macroeconomic 
stability to its members. However, because it is pegged to a currency of econo-
mies  with  structures  and  growth  patterns  not  necessarily  similar  to  those  in 
WCA, the CFAf has been subjected to prolonged periods of large appreciation, 
thus placing the export sectors of these countries at a competitive disadvantage.16 
Between 2000 and 2007, nominal world cotton prices increased 7 percent, 
from $US 1.30/kg to 1.40/kg. The CFAf, however, appreciated against the $US 
from CFAf 712 to CFAf 479 during this period. 17 Hence, in domestic currency 
terms, the C-4 cotton producers experienced a 28 percent decline in the nominal 
price of cotton. In fact, the CFAf has experienced the highest appreciation against 
the $US compared to the currencies of the world’s largest cotton suppliers some 
of which depreciated quite a lot during this period (see figure 7). Five of the eight 
countries depicted in figure 7 are the world’s top cotton exporters: United States 
(not included in the figure), India, Uzbekistan, WCA, Brazil, and Australia. 
5. CONCLUSION 
This paper examined the implications of the Memorandum of Understanding be-
tween  Brazil  and  the United  States over their  long-running  cotton  dispute.  It 
concludes that in addition to ending the dispute, and thus avoiding a trade war, 
                                                           
15 Although the cotton sectors of WCA countries have been taxed, this is not specific to either cot-
ton or the countries in question. SSA is the only region in the world that still taxes agriculture. 
Anderson and Masters (2009) estimate that the Nominal Rate of Assistance (taxation when nega-
tive) to export commodities in Africa averaged close to 20 percent during the early 2000s. In a 
study that compared the cotton by-products industries of various countries, Baffes (2010b) notes 
that while in the US the value of by-products roughly covers the costs of ginning, in Benin and 
Burkina Faso it covers only one quarter, further evidence of the inefficiencies of and relatively 
low prices in the WCA cotton sectors. 
16 In many respects, this is similar to the problems surfaced in the periphery of the euro zone dur-
ing 2010. The macroeconomic stability (including low inflation and low interest rates) enjoyed by 
all euro members came at the expense of competitiveness of some members. 
17 The CFA’s overvaluation of the early 1990s led to the 1994 devaluation. Numerous authors had 
measured the degree of CFAf’s overvaluation. For example, Devarajan (1999), using a simple 
CGE model, estimated that during 1993, the CFAf overvaluation ranged from a low 3 percent 
(Benin) to a high of 78 percent (Cameroon). Baffes et al (1999) used a reduced form econometric 
model and estimated that Côte d’Ivoire’s overvaluation exceeded 40 percent in 1993. 14 
 
the Memorandum touches upon two key constraints of the current WTO conflict 
resolution  process,  namely,  the  inability  of  less  powerful  trading  partners  to 
bring their cases to the WTO and the need to broaden the ‚sentencing‛ pending 
the bringing of inconsistent policies into conformity with WTO law.18 
What would have been a more appropriate course of action? For the Unit-
ed States (and other cotton-subsidizing countries), not having subsidies at all or, 
a second best, phasing them out as the US General Accountability Office (1995) 
recommended 15 years ago.19 For the C-4 (and, perhaps, other cotton producing 
developing countries) joining forces with Brazil in its dispute settlement case 
may have been most beneficial. Going forward, until WTO rules are reconfigured 
to address the dispute settlement system’s shortcomings, the smallest and poor-
est  developing  countries  should  align  their  interest  and  form  coalitions  with 
more powerful developing nations. Of course, such opportunities may not be 
available, underscoring the need to reconsider the dispute settlement system. 
While stressing the importance of subsidy elimination, this paper argues 
that the solution to the ‘cotton problem’ would require actions on other fronts as 
well. First, the WCA (and other developing) countries should embrace new tech-
nologies to increase their competitiveness. The most promising avenue to pursue 
at the moment is adoption of biotech cotton varieties, following China’s and In-
dia’s lead (and, more recently Burkina Faso’s). Second, cotton producing coun-
tries should deepen and broaden their domestic reform efforts in order to reduce 
costs  of  production,  especially  at  the  primary  processing  level  via  increased 
competition in ginning. On the other hand, it should be recognized that the WCA 
countries  lost  competitiveness  during  the  early  and  mid-2000s  because  of  the 
CFAf’s appreciation against the $US. Because it is beyond the control of an indi-
vidual WCA country to choose the exchange rate regime that is consistent with 
the structure of its economy, the case for deepening the on-going policy reforms 
and accelerating the adoption of new technologies is even more compelling. 
But, at the outset, it all comes down to three basic principles: (i) do not dis-
tort global markets to ensure a level playing field, (ii) undertake all necessary 
                                                           
18 It should be recognized, however, that this issue is quite complex economically and legally (see 
Bagwell, Mavroidis, and Staiger 2007). 
19 GAO (p.3) concluded as follows: ‚The cotton program has evolved over the past 60 years into a costly, 
complex maze of domestic and international price supports that benefit producers at great cost to the gov-
ernment and society. From 1986 through 1993, the cotton program’s costs totaled $12 billion, an average of 
$1.5 billion a year. Moreover, the program is very complex, with dozens of key factors that interact and 
counteract to determine price, acreage, and payments and to restrict imports. The severe economic condi-
tions and many of the motivations that led to the cotton program in the 1930s no longer exist … The Con-
gress could, for example, reduce or phase out payments over a number of years, perhaps over the life of the 
next [1996] farm bill.‛ 15 
 
domestic  policy  reforms  to  reduce  costs,  and  (iii)  adopt  new  technologies  to 
maintain competitiveness.   16 
 
Table 1: Cotton Exports 
  1990-94  1995-99  2000-04  2005-09  1990-94  1995-99  2000-04  2005-09 
  ------------------ Thousand tons ------------------  ------------------ Share (%) ---------------------- 
United States  1,539  1,418  2,479  2,978  26.0  25.1  37.6  37.5 
European Union     233     329     345     312    3.9    5.8    5.2    3.9 
Brazil       48         6     171     435    0.8    0.1    2.6    5.5 
C-4     289     485     558     490    4.9    8.6    8.5    6.2 
Benin       76     136     141       98    1.3    2.4    2.1    1.2 
Burkina Faso       60       95     164     219    1.0    1.7    2.5    2.8 
Chad       50       73       61       40    0.8    1.3    0.9    0.5 
Mali     104     180     192     134    1.8    3.2    2.9    1.7 
Others  3,811  3,403  3,048  3,719  64.4  60.3  46.2  46.9 
WORLD  5,919  5,641  6,601  7,934  100  100  100  100 
Source: United States Department of Agriculture 
Note: Cotton used to be a key contributor to Chad’s export revenues. Today, Chad’s key mer-
chandise export is crude oil. 
   17 
 
Table 2: Co-movement between Cotton and Agricultural Commodity Prices 
  ————— Eq. (1) —————  — Eq. 2 (D1=1, 1960-2001) —  — Eq. 2 (D1=1, 1960-2002) — 
  1960-2009  1960-2010  1960-2009  1960-2010  1960-2009  1960-2010 




       




















       










































0.91  0.91  0.93  0.92  0.93  0.92 
ADF  -6.03***  -6.21***  -7.17***  -7.00***  -7.34***  -6.86*** 
Source: Author’s estimates based on World Bank price data. 
Notes: The dependent variable is the logarithm of cotton price. The numbers in parentheses de-
note absolute t-values while asterisks denote parameter estimates significant at 10 percent (*), 5 
percent (**) and 1 percent (***) levels, respectively. ADF is the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (Dickey 
and Fuller 1979) statistic for unit root and corresponds to the MacKinnon one-sided p-value. The 
lag length of the corresponding ADF equations was determined by minimizing the Schwarz-loss 
function. The standard errors and covariance matrix have been estimated in a heteroskedasticity-
consistent manner using White’s method. 18 
 
Figure 1 




Cotton Exports as Share of Total Merchandize Exports (2004-07 Average) 
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Notes: The figures refer to fiscal year (Oct-Sep). Years 2010 and 2011 are estimates as of November 2010.
















2 Source: Author’s calculations based on IMF (IFS statistics) and Word Bank data19 
 
Figure 3 




Agriculture and Cotton Price Indices (Real, MUV-deflated, 2000=100) 
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6 Source: International Cotton Advisory Committee21 
 
Figure 7 
Appreciation (-)/Depreciation (+) of Local Currencies against the $US 
(% change from 2000 to 2007) 
 
   









7 Source: Author’s calculations based on IMF (IFS statistics)22 
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APPENDIX A 
The Key Milestones of the Cotton Dispute: 
The Cotonou Workshop and the Honk Kong Ministerial 
The development component of the cotton initiative was addressed at a WTO-
sponsored workshop (Cotonou, Benin, March 23-24, 2004.) The delivery mechan-
isms and coordination arrangements were outlined as follows (WTO 2004, para-
graph 13): 
On delivery mechanisms: “The preference was widely held for the use of exist-
ing mechanisms in the delivery of financial and technical assistance. This position was 
itself based on the consistently held position by many developing countries for enhanced 
coordination within the development community in the delivery of financial and technic-
al assistance, and the avoidance of the confusing proliferation of overlapping mechanisms. 
There was reluctance for the creation of new international bureaucracies and a preference 
for the more effective use of existing institutions. Bilateral donors and multilateral insti-
tutions considered that synergies should be built, with enhanced coordination, around the 
Poverty  Reduction  Strategy  Papers  (PRSPs)  or  national  development  plans,  and  the 
African Development Bank's Country Strategy Papers (CSPs), which are derived from 
priorities reflected in the PRSPs. Bilateral donors and multilateral institutions were in 
support of the accelerated use of the Integrated Framework for Trade-Related Technical 
Assistance for LDCs (IF), and the Joint Integrated Technical Assistance Programme for 
African Countries (JITAP). On such a fast-track basis, eligible countries would have the 
IF (for LDCs) and the JITAP (for African countries) used as the mechanisms for main-
streaming cotton-specific financial and technical assistance into the development vehicles 
of their PRSPs or national development plans and Country Strategy Papers and for deli-
vering such assistance.‛ 
On coordination arrangements: “The specific issue of enhanced and focused 
coordination between bilateral donors and multilateral institutions was carefully consi-
dered, keeping in view the urgent necessity to retain the momentum and follow-up on the 
identified areas of financial and technical assistance after the Workshop. It was felt that 
coordination would need to take account of 4 crucial factors: knowledge of the region; po-
verty reduction targets, jurisdictional competence of the subject matter; and, bilateral do-
nor partner support. As a result, there was broad support that the immediate follow-up 
process of coordination and implementation after the Workshop would be actively led by 
the World Bank, the African Development Bank, the ICAC, the FAO, bilateral donors 
including the United States and the European Commission, and one representative of the 
African cotton producing countries.” 
The trade component of the cotton initiative was addressed at the WTO’s 
6th Ministerial (Honk Kong, December 13-18, 2005; see WTO 2005, paragraph 11): 27 
 
“We recall the mandate given by the Members in the Decision adopted by the 
General Council on 1 August 2004 to address cotton ambitiously, expeditiously and spe-
cifically, within the agriculture negotiations in relation to all trade-distorting policies 
affecting the sector in all three pillars of market access, domestic support and export com-
petition, as specified in the Doha text and the July 2004 Framework text. We note the 
work already undertaken in the Sub-Committee on Cotton and the proposals made with 
regard to this matter. Without prejudice to Members' current WTO rights and obliga-
tions, including those flowing from actions taken by the Dispute Settlement Body, we 
reaffirm our commitment to ensure having an explicit decision on cotton within the agri-
culture negotiations and through the Sub-Committee on Cotton ambitiously, expeditious-
ly and specifically as follows: First all forms of export subsidies for cotton will be elimi-
nated by developed countries in 2006. Second, on market access, developed countries 
will give duty and quota free access for cotton exports from least-developed countries 
(LDCs) from the commencement of the implementation period. Third, it is recognized 
that the objective is that, as an outcome for the negotiations, trade distorting domestic 
subsidies for cotton production should be reduced more ambitiously than under whatev-
er general formula is agreed and that it should be implemented over a shorter period of 
time than generally applicable. We will commit ourselves to give priority in the negotia-




Table B1: Area under biotech cotton varieties (percent of area allocated to cotton) 
  US  Australia  Mexico  China  S. Africa  Argentina  India  Colombia  Brazil  B. Faso  WORLD 
1996/07  12.7    7.7    0.8  —  —  —  —  —  —  —    2.0 
1997/08  25.5  14.0    7.8    0.7  —  —  —  —  —  —    4.4 
1998/09  45.0  15.4  14.3    2.4  12.0    0.8  —  —  —  —    6.6 
1999/00  58.7  22.7  12.5  14.2  28.0    3.9  —  —  —  —  12.1 
2000/01  71.1  30.0  33.4  25.0  24.0    6.1  —  —  —  —  15.7 
2001/02  76.7  30.0  27.4  32.0  74.0    4.6  —  —  —  —  18.1 
2002/03  75.4  30.0  37.6  48.7  84.0    8.0    0.5  —  —  —  20.2 
2003/04  75.1  60.0  41.4  51.6  86.0  10.0    1.1    0.5  —  —  20.8 
2004/05  78.0  60.0  60.6  59.1  75.0  10.0    6.1  23.0  —  —  24.3 
2005/06  81.0  90.0  57.4  62.2  84.0  20.0  14.1  40.0  —  —  28.4 
2006/07  85.4  90.0  59.0  66.6  91.0  25.0  41.5  44.0    0.5  —  36.5 
2007/08  90.2  95.0  60.0  61.0  95.0  25.0  66.3  57.0  13.0  —  43.5 
2008/09  92.6  95.0  65.0  65.7  95.0  25.0  74.0  71.0  20.0    1.6  47.1 
2009/10  95.0  95.0  62.0  68.0  95.0  85.0  79.3  61.0  20.0  30.5  52.0 
Source: International Cotton Advisory Committee 
Notes: ‘—‘ indicates that no biotech cotton was used. 
 